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ENJOINING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' STRIKES:
DEALING WITH RECALCITRANT DEFENDANTS
PATRICK D. HALLIGAN*
AYING STRIKES by those in the public service are illegal does
not make them go away. The traditional mode of dealing with
illegal strikes has been the injunction. Methods of enforcing
injunctions are the key to their effectiveness and, as such, determine
the practicality of issuing them. Enforcement of the injunction when
there is a recalcitrant defendant is by the court's power of contempt.'
There are a number of methods by which the court may use its con-
tempt power to coerce defendants into complying with the injunction.
Following a brief review of the injunction and enforcement cycle,
this article will consider various methods which may be effective
when dealing with recalcitrant defendants. Underlying substantive
issues, such as the right to strike' and the right to advocate' strikes,
are not discussed.
INJUNCTIVE PROCESS AND THE CONTEMPT PROCEDURE
The classic procedure in obtaining an injunction may begin with
a restraining order. By alleging irrevocable injury or injury unas-
certainable in amount and asking that the court maintain the status
quo, an ex parte restraining order may be granted. This is an
emergency procedure and is effective for only a very short period
of time. A temporary injunction, which requires notice to the de-
fendant, thus giving him an opportunity to be heard, may then be
issued for a longer period of time. A permanent injunction is prop-
erly issued only after a full hearing, at which the defendant has the
right to call witnesses and to cross-examine the moving party's wit-
*MR. HALLIGAN received his B.A. from Stanford and his J.D. from the
University of Chicago Law School. He is a member of the Illinois bar and is
currently on active duty as a Captain in the United States Army.
1. See CHAFFEE AND RE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQurry (1965).
2. Absent legislation, there is no inherent right of public employees to strike.
The real purpose of most statutes prohibiting strikes is either to restrict or require
judicial imposition of penalties for strikes that do occur. KAPLAN, THE LAW OF
CIVIL SERVICE (1958).
3. No right to strike exists, yet the right to advocate strikes may exist. Cf.
Stewart v. Washington, 301 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1969).
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nesses. Because of the increasing formalities of the process, the
question is often raised whether disobedience of a restraining order
should be punished in the same way as disregard of a permanent
injunction. If restraining orders are issued only in true emergency
situations, then they do deserve enforcement, for if such orders are
not enforced the defendants may be able to substantially circumvent
legal procedure and force the plaintiff to accept unfair terms in an
agreement.
As previously mentioned, disobedience may be punished by the
court on a motion for contempt by the injured party. But whether
withdrawal of such motion by the movant divests the court of
power to proceed with punishment is a question of particular impor-
tance in labor disputes involving public service employees, for am-
nesty is frequently sought-and granted. However, if a court is to
vindicate its own authority, and if strikes are to be prevented, the
possibility of irremittable liability should be presented to the union,
its leaders, and its members. Otherwise, withdrawal of punishment
will become a routine part of any out-of-court labor settlement, and
the contempt power will become worthless. Some courts4 have re-
fused to dismiss contempt proceedings against unionists, notwith-
standing a withdrawal of plaintiff's motion, holding that jurisdiction
to punish for contempt is not dependent upon agreements of the
prosecuting party. This unenforceability of amnesty agreements
strengthens observations that public employees must look ultimately
to political electoral pressure and persuasion, and not to collective
bargaining to secure economic betterment.!
Understanding the troublesome distinction between civil and crim-
inal contempt is necessary for full appreciation of the problems
of enforcing injunctions. In ancient practice, such a distinction was
not drawn; all contempt proceedings were summary in nature, in-
volved no jury, and could not be appealed. Only the writ of habeas
corpus could test a commitment for contempt and then only on the
4. E.g., O'Malley v. United States, 128 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1942). See the fol-
lowing Canadian cases: Tilco Plastics v. Skurat, 57 D.L.R.2d 596 (1966); Canadian
Transport v. Alsbury, I D.L.R. 385 (1952); Poje v. Atty. Gen., 2 D.L.R. 785 (1953).
See also Beatrice Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Educ., 90 S. Ct. 14
(1969); Weinstein v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 49 Misc. 2d 170, 267 N.Y.S.2d 111
(1966).
5. See Cornell, Collective Bargaining By Public Employee Groups, 107 U. PA.
L. Rnv. 43 (1958).
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ground of jurisdiction. Later, however, the concept of civil con-
tempt arose, which permitted appeal on the underlying private issues
(e.g., of contracts, conveyance, or tort) to serve as a basis for testing
the propriety of the contempt finding. The doctrine of civil contempt,
in that it permitted appeal, was a liberalizing concept. In later times,
however, the residuum of criminal contempt has been the vehicle
for liberalization.6 The courts and bar seem again to appreciate the
unavoidably punitive element in every contempt proceeding. The
right to a jury trial has been extended to many cases by civil rights
legislation. The existence of a right to a jury trial has been related
to the severity of the punishment which the court presumes a power
to impose. The United States Supreme Court has announced a "six
months rule," by dicta, in two major cases. In one, the suspended
six month commitment of a recalcitrant state governor, imposed
without a jury trial, was upheld. 7 In the other, summary commitment
for twenty-four months imposed upon a dishonest attorney who had
introduced a spurious will in a probate proceeding was overturned. S
Thus, distinguishing civil from criminal contempt may be important
in regard to the right to a jury trial and limitations on possible
penalties, but the distinction is fine. Pure civil contempt is difficult
to find, since some element of discipline is always present. It is often
said that civil contempt is coercive while criminal contempt is puni-
tive. If a defendent had the "keys to his cell," i.e., can toll his own
penalty by obedience, then the penalty is coercive in emphasis and
the contempt is civil. If the penalty is for a fixed term or amount of
money, then the punitive element seems dominant, and the contempt
is denoted criminal.' An interesting example of how the two ele-
ments, coercive and punitive, can merge is illustrated by the example
of a suspended fixed term sentence with a possibility of permanent
remission for obedience and demonstration of a purpose of amend-
ment.' 0
Historically, only parties joined and served with process in the in-
junction proceedings were liable for contempt for disobedience of
6. See Fox, HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT (1927).
7. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964); see Tefft, U.S. v. Bar-
nett: "Twas a Famous Victory," 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 123.
8. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
9. See Canadian cases cited in supra note 4.
10. See New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Local 890, 57 N.M. 617, 261 P.2d 648 (1953);
Jencks v. Goforth, 57 N.M. 627, 261 P.2d 655 (1953).
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the injunction. However, notice has been held a sufficient basis for
punishment for disregard of an injunction. Some courts have
claimed in such situations to be punishing not disobedience, but af-
frontery to the court." It will be argued later that this is an inap-
propriate method of discussing the problem.
Traditionally, there was no liability for disobedience of void or-
ders, i.e., orders issued without in personam or in rem jurisdiction.
A number of cases found jurisdictional defects so readily as to sug-
gest that appellate courts would give impunity for disobedience of
erroneous orders where obedience would lead to irreparable loss to
the defendant. Expeditious mandamus of the judge issuing an
injunction has also been employed by higher courts to relieve de-
fendants of the necessity of obeying erroneous orders.'" Recently,
a strictness has been shown, as in the case of United States v. United
Mine Workers,'3 which suggested that there is a duty to obey even a
void order, if it was not issued frivolously. A better test for impunity
would be the degree of irreparability of damage or preclusion of
merits as a result of compliance and the opportunity for expeditious
appeal in a particular case.' 4
POSSIBLE CONTEMPT PROCEDURES FOR ENFORCING INJUNCTIONS
UNION LIABILITY FOR FINES AND DAMAGES
A union may be fined for disobedience of an injunction; such a
mechanism was employed in the case of United States v. United Mine
Workers.' Similarly, in a representative suit, judgment can consti-
tutionally be drawn to affect joint assets of the class.' 6 This method
is attractive in that its severity automatically adjusts to the obstinacy
of the union and its members in continuing their strike. The amount
assessed against the union may be held in court as a fund out of
which the party moving for punishment can have compensation on a
11. See the following Canadian cases: Tilco Plastics v. Skurjat, 57 D.L.R.2d 596
(1966); Canadian Transport v. Alsbury, I D.L.R. 385 (1952); Poje v. Atty. Gen.,
2 D.L.R. 785 (1953).
12. Tawas & B. C. R.R. v. Josco, 44 Mich. 479, 7 N.W. 65 (1880).
13. 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
14. See Cox, The Void Order and the Duty to Obey, 16 U. Cm. L. REV. 86
(1948).
15. Supra note 13.
16. Sugg v. Thornton, 132 U.S. 524 (1889) held state statute allowing this re-
sult to be constitutional.
1969]
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
showing of his damages. This type of arrangement would tend to
emphasize the civil element of the disobedience. 17  It is true that
any contempt involves a punitive element, but the distinction be-
tween civil and criminal contempt is still maintained and may be
important procedurally.
A proposal of this type-per diem fine of the union-assumes
the entity liability of unions. Absent a statute providing otherwise,
joinder of the members by the equitable device of a class action
seems to be the sole method of suing an unincorporated association.
Furthermore, it is often said that the liability of union members is
several, not joint. What judges imply by such a formula is that the
union assets are unavailable for damage payments or fines for con-
tempt unless each member has participated in the illegal activity.
Some courts, however, without completely abandoning the aggrega-
tive (non-entity) theory of unincorporated associations and unions,
have nevertheless held joint assets (union treasuries) to be fully
available for execution of judgments for tortious conduct by fewer
than all the members.' 8 One author has suggested that an approach
more consistent with the entity theory would be availability of union
assets pro rata with the degree of membership participation. 19 Full
availability of joint assets seems to be more feasible, since such lia-
bility of unions may prompt more respect for the legal process in
those leaders who must account to the membership for union fi-
nances. Furthermore the difficulty of joining many persons may
often make entity liability a matter of necessity if a court is to have
some means of vindicating its authority. Even requiring a plaintiff
to show only ratification or authorization by all the members in order
to get at the union assets effectively denies the accessibility of union
assets in virtually all cases.
Since questions of procedure, liability, and agency are difficult to
separate in this area, comprehensive legislation is needed. The leg-
islature is better equipped than the courts to accomplish such a large
change in the method of processing disputes with unions. An ex-
17. See Spelfogel, Enforcement of No-Strike Clause by Injunction, Damage Ac-
tion and Discipline, 17 LAB. L.J. 77 (1966).
18. United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1966);
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922); and United
States v. A.M.A., 28 F. Supp. 752 (D.D.C. 1939).
19. See Dodd, Dogma and Practice in the Law of Associations, 42 Hv. L.
REV. 977 (1929).
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ample of judicial leadership in this area, however, is the California
judiciary. In a line of cases culminating in Daniels v. Sanitarium
Assn., Inc.,20 the California Supreme Court established: unions
may be sued as entities; union assets are fully available for execu-
tion of judgments, notwithstanding the innocence of some members;
and unions may sue others, the amount of recovery to be paid into
the general union treasury and not to individual members.
Brief mention may be made of interpretation of statutes permitting
a suit in the common name of the union. Some courts consider
these statutes "procedural only," holding that only several liability
of the members can be invoked by plaintiff. Other courts have ef-
fectively interpreted these statutes to impose entity liability on the
union with a limitation of liability on individual members. Imposi-
tion of entity liability without a limitation on the liability of individual
members is a third possibility. If a state is serious about the author-
ity of its judges, the third possibility would seem advisable.2' This
is especially desirable if the union is poorly funded, thus presenting
a meager chance for penalty assessment.22
MEMBERSHIP MONETARY LIABILITY-VICARIOUS LIABILITY
It seems probable that members of an unincorporated association
may be held liable as members per se (rather than as individually
disobedient parties) for unpaid fines of the association, but the ag-
gregate theory of several liability alone, or even in conjunction with
the entity theory, does not permit this. Much of the apparent assim-
ilation of associations to partnerships is expressed by way of denying
entity treatment to them rather than by way of imposing vicarious
liability for one member's actions on the other members.2" The
imposition of liability on members based on agency principles pre-
sents questions of fairness and due process.
20. 59 Cal. 2d 602, 30 Cal. Rptr. 828, 381 P.2d 651 (1963). See also 6
AM. JurR. 2d, Assn's and Clubs, § 52 (1963).
21. See Dodd, supra note 19; United Mine Workers v. Coronado, supra note
18; Comment, Unions as Juridical Persons, 66 YALE L.J. 712 (1957).
22. For further articles relevant to the discussion in this section see: Forkosch,
The Legal Status and Suability of Labor Organizations, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1954);
Comment, The Problem of Capacity in Union, Potpourri of Erie, Diversity and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 YALE L.J. 1182 (1959).
23. See Dodd, supra note 19; Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933);
Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677 (1889).
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Necessity may justify vicarious liability. However, the entity con-
cept may not be powerful enough. If union funds are insufficient
to pay fines initially, the entity treatment might allow satisfaction
out of any funds that later come into the union treasury. To avoid
payment, the union would then have to cease collecting dues. This
fact alone makes entity treatment a powerful enforcement technique.
Entity treatment of this sort involves vicarious liability to the extent
that innocent parties have contributed to the union treasury. It is
conceivable to extend such a notion of vicarious liability to permit
a court either to require a union to continue to collect dues from
its membership (and to require the members to pay these) and to
pay them to the court until a judgment or fine against the union has
been satisfied, or to require the public employer to do this for the
union and its membership on a theory analogous to garnishment.
Such a procedure would impose entity liability on the union with-
out any limitation upon the liability of the members and would fur-
ther require that the individual members assume the status of in-
demnitors of the union. This is what is meant by joint and several
liability at common law.24 This type of several liability, each liable
for the whole amount, has occasionally been imposed upon members
of unincorporated groups.25 Such a procedure presents questions
of fairness to innocent members. However, in Southern Ornamental
Iron Works v. Morrow,26 an absent party, a member of a defendant
class in a class action suit, was required to pay plaintiff on execution
of a money judgment in the main suit. The defendant class con-
sisted of the members of an unincorporated association with whom
plaintiff had had dealings. Professor Moore suggests that such
membership liability is not available under the Federal Rules. 27
However, a class action mechanism can be made to apply to all the
24. Where a number of defendants are jointly and severally liable, joint assets
are available for execution in a suit against one (which is not the case in several
liability alone), but not all right to recovery is merged in the first judgment so
that it does not bar judgment against another defendant in a subsequent suit (as it
would in joint liability alone). See PROSSER, TORTS 258-78 (3d ed. 1964).
25. Gross-Loge Der Deutschen Ordens Der Harugari Des Staates Massachusettes
v. Cusson, 301 Mass. 332, 17 N.E.2d 316 (1938); Webster v. San Joaquin Fruit and
Vegetable Growers Protective Ass'n, 32 Cal. App. 264, 162 P. 654 (1916).
26. 101 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). See also Richardson v. Kelly, 144
Tex. 497, 191 S.W.2d 857 (1945).
27. MOORE, 3B FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 23.11(2) n.32 (1969); 3A id. § 17.25.
But see infra note 58 and text.
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members of a union and to serve as the basis for contempt proceed-
ings against any one of them. 8 In a recent case, however, where
the members of a union were sued as a class and the union was not
joined, the court held that the effect of the judgment was not
entity treatment of the union but several liability of the members.
The court suggested that the quantum of each member's liability
would have to be determined and that due process considerations
would prevent levying on a member without a showing of such quan-
tum. 29 It appears that, under the rules, some matters can be con-
cluded against absent individual members by virtue of their mem-
bership in a class, but ultimate liability cannot be so determined.
Requirements of due process will be satisfied if an individual
member is given the opportunity to remove himself from the class
of illegal strikers by communicating to his public employer his good
faith, by presenting himself for duty, or by allowing a subsequent ju-
dicial hearing. Once these opportunities are provided, the initiative
and burden of proof should be on the individual member. Proof
of each individual's quantum of liability should not be made impos-
sible for the moving party. In concerted activity such as a strike,
separability of damage causation is difficult. If the moving party
makes a reasonable effort to identify various differentially active
groups within the whole class, the burden of showing further indi-
vidual differences should be placed on individual members. The
evidentiary topics of burden of proof and theories of presumptions
will not be discussed in this article."0 It is sufficient to remark that
presumptions both of concerted activity"1 on the one hand, and of
participation8 2 in concerted activity on the other, have frequently
been employed to convict and sentence individuals to imprisonment
for crime.
In general, though the prospect of imposing liability on innocent
members is unfavorable, necessity may support vicarious liability in
some cases. Perhaps a type of prima facie vicarious liability of the
membership with provision for an individual member to prove his
28. MOORE, 3B id. at § 23.11, n.29-30.
29. Oskoian v. Canuel, 269 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1959).
30. See Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, 16 So. CAL. L. REV. 245
(1943); Ashford and Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in
Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165 (1969).
31. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 n.439 (Supp. 1969).
32. 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 n. 439 (Supp. 1969).
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own failure to participate, authorize, or ratify the illegal strike would
be a reconciliation of policies in some cases. Otherwise, for the
plaintiff to be required to make a showing of mutual authorization,
or the like, might be almost as difficult as establishing individual
liability for illegal action of all the members. If injunctions can be
enforced only by making the penalty for disobedience felt widely
among the membership, then some practical way of imposing liabil-
ity on members for concerted action seems necessary. How to cate-
gorize such liability and how to invoke it are difficult problems.
It must again be observed that liability, agency, and procedure
are inextricably intertwined in this area. 8  In the private sector,
Congress has expressed, in the form of anti-injunction legislation, a
strong policy preference against the imposition of liability upon inno-
cents for the acts of others. 4 There are similar statutory provisions
in seventeen states.3 5 A similar policy against membership liability
is expressed in the National Labor Relations Act. 6 The problem
of strikes in the public service sector of the states is an independent
question.
Constitutional Limitations on Vicarious Liability
And on Liability Without Fault
Constitutional limitations on the imposition of vicarious liability
may depend upon the severity of the penalty on the individual ren-
dered liable and on the civil-criminal distinction. The broad scope
of vicarious liability in civil actions has not raised serious constitu-
tional objections. There seem to be, however, some limitations on
both strict and vicarious liability doctrines in criminal law.17  For
that reason, the distinction between civil and criminal contempt is
important.
In a variety of regulatory or mala prohibita cases, the Supreme
Court has upheld convictions for crimes without a showing of mens
rea, such as convictions for narcotics violations, pure food laws, and
33. See Witmer, Trade Union Liability, 51 YALE L.J. 40 (1941).
34. 29 U.S.C.A. § 101 (1958).
35. See AARON, The Labor Injunction in the U.S., in REPORT OF A STUDY OF THE
LABOR INJUNCTION IN ONTARIO (Carrothers ed. 1966). Other states require judicial
intervention in some strikes. See KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 236.
36. 29 U.S.C.A. § 185b (1965).
37. See Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 107.
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trespass. Shifting the burden of proving mens rea of the defendant
has been upheld,38 but the Court seems unwilling to construe crim-
inal statutes as not including mens rea requirements unless the lan-
guage of the statute is clear. In the case of passive crimes, the
Court has required notice to defendant of the duty imposed by the
criminal law in order to sustain conviction. First amendment limita-
tions on strict liability are also to be found, and some statutes have
fallen for reason of "vagueness." A concern for the severity of
punishment is also evidenced in the cases. This suggests that due
process considerations are susceptible of balancing individual and
societal interests in this area. The "cruel and unusual punishment"
test has invalidated one strict liability crime.8 9
Vicarious liability is to be distinguished from strict liability. Strict
liability is the imposition of liability for one's own acts done without
mens rea, while vicarious liability is the imposition of liability for
the acts of another. However, the doctrines often seem to merge.
Vicarious liability is often discussed in terms of imputation of knowl-
edge of another to the defendant. In such cases, not only the knowl-
edge but the acts of another are assigned to the defendant. By
whatever formula, such liability for the acts of another has been
imposed in the economic, regulatory and welfare law areas. Further-
more, strict and vicarious liability have been combined to convict a
master for the unauthorized acts of his unknowing servant; that is,
the master has been held vicariously liable for the acts of a strictly
liable servant who acted without mens rea. However, such liability
has been held valid only to support a penalty of fine and not impris-
onment.40 The limitations found in the strict liability cases seem
properly to be applied to the vicarious liability cases. Both theories
are doctrines of liability without fault. 41
If there is room for criminal convictions based on the combination
of strict and vicarious liability, then vicarious liability of union mem-
bers for deficiencies of the union treasury in a contempt proceeding
38. See supra note 30.
39. See Packer, supra note 37, discussing various cases which dispensed with the
requirement of mens rea.
40. See Commonwealth v. Koczcwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959).
41. See Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for Acts of Another, 43 HARv. L. REv.
689 (1930); Young, Vicarious Liability for Crime, Part 1, 1967 JUR. REV. 1;
MECHEM, OUTLINE OF AGENCY, §§ 407-11 (1952); WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE
GENERAL PART 285-86 (1953).
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seems possible. Another analogy which might help put any pro-
posal for vicarious liability in perspective can be drawn from the
law of municipal corporations. If the treasury of a local governmental
body is insufficient to fulfill a judgment or a bond payment, it is
often said that the person possessing the judgment42 or claim4" has
standing to sue for a writ of mandamus"4 against the tax collector
ordering him to levy 45 a tax sufficient to satisfy the judgment or
claim. Presumably a new resident of such taxing district could
not object to the tax levied to fulfill the judgment. This analogous
situation points out that the recovery by a judgment creditor in a
tort suit against a municipality is not limited to the size of its treas-
ury, for the plaintiff can effectively pierce the governmental veil to
recover from the constituents of the municipality, and taxpayers must
pay in such a case whether or not they acted tortiously as individuals.
To require a union to assess its members to satisfy a judgment is no
more shocking than ordering a tax collector to levy on the citizens
to satisfy a judgment. Similar analogies can be found in cases
where creditors compel a corporation to exercise its charter powers to
assess46 or call upon47 the stockholders for more money. Such
provisions are sometimes statutorily required4" in charters of finan-
cial savings institutions.
Further support for the view that some explicit provision for vi-
carious liability may be constitutionally acceptable is the observation
that entity and joint individual liability both imply a degree of vi-
carious liability. The funds collected from nonparticipating mem-
bers are liable under the entity treatment. A jointly liable participat-
ing member may be required to pay not only damages attributable
42. 17 MCQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 51.46 (1968), citing Meri-
wether v. Garett, 102 U.S. 472 (1880).
43. Id. at § 51.45, citing Vallette v. Vero Beach, Fla., 104 F.2d 59 (5th Cir.
1939).
44. Id. at §§ 51.02-.16 discussing the history and prerogative (discretionary) na-
ture of the wait at common law as well as traditional pleading requirements.
45. Id. at § 51.44 citing County of Cook v. Columbia Ins. Co., 329 Ill. 189,
160 N.E. 351 (1928).
46. Porter v. Northern Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 36 N.D. 199, 161 N.W. 1012
(1917).
47. Seyberth v. American Commander Mining and Milling Co., Ltd., 42 Idaho
254, 245 P. 392 (1926).
48. Leach v. Arthur Say. Bank, 203 Iowa 1052, 213 N.W. 772 (1927).
308 [Vol. XIX:298
ENJOINING PUBLIC EMBLOYEES' STRIKES
to his own acts, but entire damages.49 Thus, the participating mem-
ber is liable for his own fault and also that of others. It may be
argued, however, that imposing liability for the acts of others on one
who has in no way participated is a more difficult undertaking. The
point, though, is merely that the presently accepted doctrine already
contains some element of vicarious liability.
Having suggested that a limited degree of vicarious liability of
union members could pass constitutional scrutiny if the possibility of
liability for acts of their fellows were made known to unionists, the
constitutional problems of individual liability take on a new light.
To make the imposition of individual liability effective, as has been
suggested earlier, there must be some restrictions on the number of
issues each member may individually argue. In terms of the class
action device, individuals must be required to follow the lead of rep-
resentative litigants in some issues. If each member is given an op-
portunity to be heard on matters unique to his position, due process
seems satisfied. The proposal of vicarious liability suggests that
participation vel non by an individual member not be a question as
to which a member has a right to be heard. A public service worker
under such a system, by taking employment, would be submitting
himself to the chance of liability without opportunity to be heard
regarding participation. The right to engage in certain businesses
and to adopt certain forms for doing business is similarly condi-
tioned. If a potential government employee can know at the outset
what the scope of his vicarious liability might be, then his choice to
enter the public service would be deemed an acceptance of that
liability.
The question would be more difficult if vicarious liability of co-
workers for illegal strikes were imposed on all occupations, because
no alternatives would be available, and the employee's choice of em-
ployment could not be characterized as a waiver. On the other
hand, singling out public service as an occupation to be dealt with
specially may be criticized. Vicarious liability in some areas is rea-
sonably related to the goal of prevention of strikes in the public
service, although not in all areas, and is therefore not an unreason-
able classification. Control of strikes in the public service sector is
49. A dramatic example is the infamous case of Lowe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S.
274 (1908).
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thought to be especially important, because they are especially in-
jurious to the community. The economic factors making such
strikes of special significance are beyond the scope of this article."
Some notion of "burden" shifting5' or a requirement that an indi-
vidual member affirmatively take himself out of the defendant
class seems tolerable if such devices are viewed against the alterna-
tive of simple vicarious liability. Otherwise, the members could re-
quire the moving party to incur very large legal expenses in proving
the same issue many times. By putting the initiative on the mem-
bers, some of the expenses of litigation are placed upon them.
Once the notion of membership liability is accepted to some de-
gree, the question of the scope of the liability arises. The question
then becomes the ascertainment of the "scope of the membership."
The issues of equal protection and due process raised in connection
with the general question of membership liability arise again with
each proposed increment in the scope of the membership.
Although the special necessity of enjoining strikes in the public
service may justify membership liability as to some actions of mem-
bers, the categorization of such actions would have to be carefully
drawn. They should be clearly related to the purpose of preventing
strikes in a critical area. Identification of acts done in furtherance
of the position of the union or the membership should not be impos-
sible. Any new legislation should offer clear guides to the identifi-
50. In the long run, public service unions can keep their prices higher than com-
petitive levels only by restricting supply. In that respect, the states are their own
worst enemy in some areas. Teachers' licensing requirements and tenure guarantees
are examples. If such requirements were eliminated, then recruitment of personnel
willing to work at competitive rates would be the corrective to demands for higher
rates by present employees. The actual employees at any given time do have a
temporary disruptive power but this is true in private activities also. Some differ-
ences, however, between private and public industries may cause concern. First,
the processes of sub-contracting, relocation of firms and industries, and founding of
new firms-by which institutional (union) restrictions on available supply of labor
are overcome in the long run-may not operate in the public sphere. The Chicago
Police Department cannot delegate its duties to Peoria and cannot relocate in Spring-
field. Secondly, the short run disruptive effects of strikes in the public service
may be very severe; that is, the derived demand for public service labor may in a
certain range be very inelastic, because the demand for the product is inelastic in
certain ranges and because in the short run technical substitutes for the labor factor
are unavailable. There is a feeling that public service employees might be in a
better position to exploit short run considerations than other striking workers would
be. Transit workers are a good example. If these arguments are valid, then grant-
ing the right to strike without more is not enough.
51. See supra note 30.
ENJOINING PUBLIC EMBLOYEES' STRIKES
cation of acts done within the scope of the membership, i.e., acts
for which co-members may be vicariously liable.
The inhibitions on vicarious liability and mass membership liabil-
ity are more practical and political than constitutional. Practically,
the administration of a scheme requiring a levy on the assets of many
individuals may be very cumbersome. Such schemes may also pro-
long the controversy and cause lingering bitterness after the strike,
which could be disastrous in public service occupations where esprit
is important to efficiency. Voluntary incorporation by the union,
furthermore, might prevent vicarious liability of the members. In
the private sector, such penalties upon strikers have formally been
prohibited and would likely have become politically impossible, even
without anti-injunction legislation.
Doctrinal arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, the common
expectation of laymen is not that labor unions, even in the public
sector, will be dealt with by the law of agency.5 2 Many persons, if
asked, might say that strikes in the public service should be disal-
lowed. But if asked whether they would be in favor of remedies
necessary to suppress such strikes, most would likely hesitate or re-
spond in the negative. That is, when forced to consider remedial
consequences of prohibition of strikes in the public service, most
persons would likely discover they are not fundamentally opposed to
strikes in that area. A key problem is that many state judges have
not considered what might be required in order to deal with disobedi-
ence. Injunctions of illegal strikes have issued, but they have not
been enforced by the issuing courts. In that respect, the issuing
judges have diminished the prestige of the court. Though the state
of the law regarding the public service might, in many states, allow
judicial intervention by courts with equity powers, it may be pre-
dicted that legislative change would render such judicial inventions
of but fleeting use. Just as cases in the private sector imposing lia-
bility on individual members of a striking union became infamous,
so also the use of such remedies in the public sector would likely
be viewed unfavorably by the citizenry and the agencies of gov-
ernment.
52. MECHEM, supra note 41, at § 8.
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LIABILITY TO FINE AND JAIL TERMS OF
INDIVIDUALLY ENJOINED PERSONS
Each employee is individually enjoinable from striking, and his own
deliberate disobedience may be punished by fines or imprisonment.
Whether one who has not been made a party to the action by service
may be punished is the difficult question. As a matter of necessity
it may be argued that proof of his knowledge of the injunction and
disregard thereof should be sufficient ground for punishment. Some
cases imposing penalties on knowing actors not parties to the injunc-
tion have claimed that affrontery to the court and not disobedience
of the injunction is the reason for penalty. These cases would better
have been justified as a matter of necessity and practicality. In fact
they were cases punishing disobedience. 3
The issue of fairness revolves about fair notice. If a court makes
a reasonable effort to notify all employees of its order, it should be
able to vindicate its authority with regard to those persons. The
older requirement of joinder for liability for contempt because of
disobedience of an injunction seems unduly restrictive and should
give way to a test of knowing disregard. Even the older cases recog-
nize the necessity in some instances of a broader effect for injunc-
tions.5 4
Selective enforcement against more obvious offenders such as
those on a picket line is a technique which may be effective;5  how-
ever, the results of such action may lead to greater solidarity of the
membership generally. Other efforts to make penalization of many
strikers feasible have experimented with putting the burden of prov-
ing nonparticipation partially on the individual employee. 56 A pro-
cedure of this sort might be a defendant class action, as seen below,
with an opportunity for individuals to come into court and petition
to be removed from the class. The important thing is to be able to
avoid relitigation of all matters in the case of every member. The
existence of an illegal strike, for example, should be susceptible of
53. See the following Canadian cases: Tilco Plastics v. Skurjat, supra note 11;
Canadian Transport v. Alsbury, supra note 11; Poje v. Atty. Gen., supra note I1.
54. See Seward v. Paterson, 1 Ch. 454, 66 L.J. Ch. 267 (1897).
55. See Spelfogel, supra note 17.
56. See 9 ILR RES. BULL., No. 1 (1965). FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) puts the
burden on defendant class members to remove themselves from the class proposed.
See supra note 30.
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determination in one hearing.57
CLASS ACTIONS
The technique of using a class action in a motion for punishment
for contempt is more available under the revised Federal Rule 23.18
57. See Kalvan & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8
U. Cm. L. REv. 696, 710 (1941).
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 23, 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1970) relates:
"(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numer-
ous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or
fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not par-
ties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect
their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds gener-
ally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution
or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concern-
ing the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in
the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the manage-
ment of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice;
Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Action.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a
class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained.
An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended
before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circum-
stances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will ex-
clude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment,
whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion;
and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an
appearance through his counsel.
The impact of the revision is two-fold. First, it makes class action
suits more available in the federal courts. Second, and more im-
portantly, the adoption of the new rule is an indication to state courts
that under certain circumstances due process to individual defendants
is fulfilled by notice which puts the initiative on them to remove
themselves from the class.
The circumstances for use of class action under Rule 23 are con-
tained in sections (a) and (b). Section (a) contains unvarying
prerequisites of numerous parties, common questions, and typicality
of representatives. Section (b) contains three alternative require-
ments, any one of which will justify a class action when accompany-
ing the requisites in (a). However, the procedural rights to be ac-
corded class members as a condition to effectiveness against them of
judgment in the case vary with the alternatives in (b). Section (c)
describes these procedural rights.
Section (b) (1) allows a class suit where there is risk of incon-
sistency should multiple suits be required while (b) (2) alterna-
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision
(b) (1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe
those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action
maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to
the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in
subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom
the court finds to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class
action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into sub-
classes and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall
then be construed and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this rule
applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of
proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in
the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the
members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be
given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any
step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity
of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate,
to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action;
(3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requir-
ing that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to represen-
tation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with
similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under
Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compro-
mised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or
compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court
directs. As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966."
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tively allows a class suit when the party opposing the class has acted
toward the class as a whole. In class action situations of either of
these types, section (c) (2) provides that judgment, favorable or
not, will affect all members of the class.
Section (b) (3) allows class action in a situation where there is
no risk of inconsistency from multiple suits and where there has
been no action toward the class as a whole, but where the court
finds that the "common questions" of section (a) dominate other
questions and finds that a class suit is preferable to multiple suits
after explicitly weighing: the interests of absent members, pend-
ing suits, difficulties of the class action, and the desirability of con-
centrating the litigation. However, if a class suit is directed on this
more tenuous basis, section (c) (2) limits the effectiveness of judg-
ment and accords greater procedural rights to absent members. In
particular, the best notice available must be given to all class mem-
bers sought to be bound. The notice must inform them that they
have an unconditional right to remove themselves from the class, but
that they will be bound unless they do so. The rule is defended in
two cases which stand for the principle that "best effort" notification
can be sufficient to grant a court personal jurisdiction over absent
parties.59
Due process questions are, arguably, more urgent when the pro-
posed class is a defendant class. The rule allows a class to "sue
or be sued" however, and a recent case uses the most tenuous
(i.e., section (b) (3)) type of class situation in the new rule to justify
a defendant class action. 0
While the class action technique may seem primarily relevant to
placement of individual liability on many persons, it also adds to the
earlier discussion on vicarious liability. This is so because use of the
class action procedure can, as a practical matter, lead to the same
results as the substantive doctrine of vicarious liability.
TRUST FUNDS AND OTHER REMEDIES
Where separate trust funds are involved, they are unavailable
59. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950);
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
60. Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 356 F.2d
442 (1966). Defendant classes were sued occasionally under the old Rule 23 as
well; see U.S.C.A. Rules, Rule 23, Notes of Decisions section 15 and supra note 28.
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in enforcement proceedings,"' but where pension schemes are estab-
lished by the public employer, not pursuant to a collective bargain-
ing agreement and without surrender of funds to a trust outside the
government, the pension rights may be able to be categorized, at
least to the extent of employer contributions, as unilateral contracts
or as gratuities rather than as vested in the employees. In such
cases, they may present opportunities for enforcement. However,
what are considered as employer contributions for purposes of
punishment is difficult to determine. Even where separate accounts
are maintained, imposition of the penalties may be administratively
costly. 02
Loss of seniority or tenure, a freeze on salary raises, cancellation
of employer pension contributions for a period, selective layoff, and
dismissal are all possible post-strike disciplinary measures which have
been employed.63
Deceitification of a union as a bargaining agent for a certain
period after the strike has terminated is a further remedy for dis-
obedience of an injunction, which will lead to cessation of check-off
dues payments to the union.
CONCLUSION
The practical problems of enforcing injunctions of strikes are
great. Furthermore, imposition of certain penalties might be so un-
popular as to result in legislative limitation upon the jurisdiction of
the courts in such matters. Such an event would not only decrease
the power of the courts in this area but might diminish their prestige
generally. Voluntary abstention from issuing injunctions where
prospects for effective enforcement are unfavorable seems preferable.
The legislative response in the face of judicial inaction might be
to allow strikes in the public service. The effect of strikes on the
price of certain services in the long run might not be great if the
bargaining positions of the public employer and the union are
equal. Still, the legislature should provide some control over
strikes in areas found to be critical. However, legislatures are not
61. See Lewis v. Benedict, 361 U.S. 459, 489 (1960).
62. See AARON, LEGAL STATUS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RIGHTS UNDER PRIVATE
PENSION PLANS (1961).
63. See Rosenzweig, Condon-Wadlin Re-Examined, 9 ILR RES. BULL., No. 1
(1965).
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readily capable of dealing with specific cases. If strikes are to be
controlled, some non-legislative agency will have to act in particular
disputes. The legislature should provide any such agency with the
personnel and procedures necessary to control strikes. The proce-
dures and remedies which the agency is authorized to employ
should be varied and flexible. If a single, extremely harsh mechan-
ism which must be applied on an all-or-nothing basis is provided,
then frequently judges or other officials will not act. The legislature
should also support the actions of such an agency politically and
should attempt to make the actions of the agency acceptable to the
community. In order to do this it must provide some method of
allowing public employees to register their demands and exercise influ-
ence over decisions on their demands short of a strike. Arbitration is
a possible method. If that is done, then the actions of the strike con-
trol agency, including imposition of penalties on individuals if neces-
sary, will hopefully be perceived by the community as acts necessary
to the implementation of good general policy, as procedures associated
with substantial non-strike alternatives of the workers, and not as
acts of mere prohibition. At the present time, it appears that the
courts frequently have been provided with neither the administrative
personnel and procedures nor the legislative endorsement necessary64
to accomplish the task of controlling strikes in the public service.
Nor have alternatives to strikes been given to the workers by the
legislative authorities, the provision of which would perhaps make
strike control more popularly acceptable. Courts might therefore
be advised to abstain from issuing injunctions against strikes in the
public service sector until the legislatures provide integrated processes
for wage determination and strike control in that area.
64. See supra notes 1 and 20.
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